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Abstract  
This paper argues that traditional arms control approaches no longer work well for even 
traditional security problems on the U.S.-Chinese security agenda for three reasons: Firstly, even 
when both states reason for arms control from the superpowers’ experience during the Cold War, 
they do so in different ways; secondly, a growing number of experts and policy elite in both 
countries do not think the benefits of formal arms control outweigh the costs and risks; and 
thirdly, those who think formal arms control has an important role to play lack a clear and 
compelling logic for why arms control is durable and achievable among highly interdependent 
states with unequal power, mixed interests, and dissimilar values. Past attempts find a new basis 
for U.S.-China security cooperation—e.g., by using voluntary measures or by relying on the 
economic interdependence of the two states—have proved insufficient. The second half of this 
paper suggests the basic elements of a cooperative security logic that could be a more 
appropriate and effective basis for cooperation. Instead of narrowly defining the objective of 
arms control as increasing deterrence stability at lower cost and risk, this logic aims more 
broadly to prevent threats from developing, provide reassurance, and promote consensual 
political order among states. Rather than trying primarily to set equal technical limitations on 
military capabilities, dialogue and negotiations should seek to ensure that whatever capabilities 
states have, including asymmetrical and dual-use ones, are used for mutually acceptable purposes 
and according to equitable behavioral rules. Issues related to transparency, verification, and 
compliance management would also be handled in ways that promote cooperation rather than 
competition. The paper concludes by examining how U.S.-Chinese cooperation in space, on 
nuclear weapons issues (including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), and on missile defense 








I was asked to provide an American perspective on cooperative approaches to “traditional” 
security problems, which I define broadly to include anything involving the threat or use of 
military force. I should provide a disclaimer, though, because my own thoughts about arms 
control are often different from the dominant view among U.S. policymakers. I do not think that 
there is one “American” perspective on security, any more than there is a single Chinese point of 
view. But I think it is useful to compare dominant themes in U.S. and Chinese thinking about 
arms control to highlight obstacles and opportunities for cooperation.  
 
As you well know, the bilateral U.S.-China strategic agenda has historically encompassed 
nuclear and conventional military issues, and increasingly also missile defense, space, and 
cybersecurity. Preventing proliferation and terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction is on 
the U.S.–China agenda for multilateral security challenges, as is managing relations with 
nuclear-armed third parties such as India, Pakistan, and North Korea, in hopes of minimizing the 
risk that nuclear use by one of them could cause grave problems for international security. 
 
I could assess the state of play on each of these important issues, but there would be little that 
you haven’t heard before. Since the mid-1990s, the United States, China, and other members of 
the international community have made much less progress on the traditional arms control and 
nonproliferation agenda than an objective observer would expect, given the dramatic changes in 
the global security environment. Today, I want to talk about why that is, and what to do about it. 
 
I will argue that traditional arms control approaches no longer work very well even for 
traditional security problems, in part due to three ways in which current U.S. and Chinese 
thinking about arms control obstructs progress.  I will also explain why some supposedly 
“innovative” ways of thinking about security cooperation are not accomplishing much, either, 
and may actually be damaging the two countries’ overall relations. Understanding why our 
ability to create more advanced weapons and more powerful multipurpose technologies has 
outstripped our ability to work together to prevent their deliberate or inadvertent misuse suggests 
a set of conceptual and practical problems on which U.S. and Chinese experts could cooperate to 
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Outmoded ideas obstruct arms control and nonproliferation 
 
There are numerous reasons why progress on arms control and nonproliferation has been more 
difficult than expected in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, including geopolitical shifts, 
changes in weapons technology, and greater activism by anti-arms control domestic political 
actors than pro-arms control groups. But there are also less obvious conceptual reasons why 
those of us who research, teach, and advise policy makers about international security may be 
inadvertently compounding the difficulties by continuing to think about arms control in ways 
that do not fit well with the current circumstances of global security. 
 
When American or Chinese experts argue for or against the utility of “traditional” arms control, 
they typically have a narrow, time-bound conception of what arms control is, how it operates, 
and what its objectives are. Usually, it’s some version of the bilateral agreements negotiated 
during the Cold War by two roughly equal superpowers to enhance deterrence stability by 
limiting or prohibiting specific types of nuclear capabilities. 
 
I define arms control more broadly, to include any cooperative constraints on security-related 
capabilities or behavior among states with a mix of common and competing interests, ideologies, 
and values.2 Many successful arms control and nonproliferation agreements have involved two 
or more states with very different military capabilities and security needs, including the 1968 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 
Arms control can take different forms, from legally binding treaties with extensive verification 
and compliance management arrangements, to politically binding accords, parallel unilateral 
initiatives, and tacit reciprocal restraint and reassurance. It can serve the military objectives 
posited in Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin’s classic 1961 book, Strategy and Arms 
Control: to reduce the risk of war, the amount of destruction should war occur, and the cost of 
military preparations. But it can also serve political objectives that are adversarial or cooperative, 
such as gaining hard or soft power advantage vis-à-vis a potential adversary, or reducing the role 
that threats and use of force play in international politics. 3 
                                           
2 Unilateral actions can be cooperative even when they are not designed to elicit reciprocal actions if the objective is 
to reassurance other states regarding real or perceived threats to other states. Unilateral arms control initiatives can 
also be adversarial, if they are intended to make other states appear to be dangerous because they do not want to 
reciprocate by taking steps that would advantage the country proposing reciprocal unilateral initiatives. Or, they may 
be undertaken for purely internal reasons, without regard to what other countries might do in response. 
3 The term “soft power” is most commonly associated now with Joseph Nye’s concept of influencing other countries 
through attractive ideas (values, culture, policies, and institutions), rather than through material means (economic 
incentives/disincentives or threats and use of force.)  Traditional realists such as Hans Morgenthau, though, included 
various types of ideas (e.g. moral and philosophical principles, legal provisions, and political ideologies) as forms of 
power when they were used as means to establish and maintain control over other individuals or countries in order to 
promote national interests, as opposed to being followed for their own sake. See Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The 
Changing Nature of American Power (1990) and Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004), as 
well as Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (orig. 1948). 
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One impediment to U.S.-China cooperation on traditional security issues is that even when 
American and Chinese experts are both reasoning from the superpowers’ experience with nuclear 
arms control during the Cold War, they do so in different ways. Americans and Chinese make 
different starting assumptions about what the main threat to security is, how deterrence and 
missile defense relate to that threat, what cooperation might be mutually beneficial, how 
verification and compliance issues should be handled, and where successful cooperation could 
lead over time. American officials use a version of the logic that informed the Reagan and 
George H.W. Bush administration’s approach to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). 
Chinese experts think about arms control in a way which is much closer to the logic 
underpinning the Strategic Arms Limitation Talk (SALT) agreements and the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty, which I call the Cambridge community logic. Because American and Chinese 
arms control experts use different logics, not only do they talk past each other, but they also 
often misjudge each other’s motives for saying what they do. 
 
Americans see China’s growing military, economic, and political power as the biggest threat to 
strategic stability. Predictions about what might happen if China uses those capabilities to deny 
U.S. access to, and freedom of action in air, sea, land, space or cyberspace are very similar to 
predictions made in the late 1970s and 1980s about how the Soviet Union could use its 
advancing nuclear capabilities to de-couple the United States from Europe, coerce U.S. allies, 
and possibly even try to fight and win a nuclear war—none of which, I should note, actually 
came true. The United States sees its “pivot to Asia” as a prudent move to preserve regional and 
global stability by maintaining U.S. conventional superiority, deploying missile defense, and 
taking other steps to reassure nervous allies. The Obama administration would like to keep 
nuclear weapons in the background of its security relationship with China. But even after 
declaring that it would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are in 
good standing under NPT,4 the United States still retains the option to initiate use against China 
despite China’s unequivocal No First Use (NFU) pledge. U.S. officials justify continued nuclear 
ambiguity as enhancing regional stability, on the theory that China will be less likely to attack 
Taiwan or engage in other conventional aggression if it knows that the United States could 
destroy some or all of its strategic nuclear weapons before it had a chance to launch them. They 
also suggest that China should want the United States to remain the dominant military power in 
the Pacific so Japan feels no need to match China’s conventional and nuclear capabilities. 
 
China actually considers U.S. military superiority and unilateralism as one of its main security 
problems, partly because the United States will not rule out using nuclear weapons for objectives 
other than retaliatory deterrence of nuclear attack. Chinese leaders have not gone as far as Soviet 
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leaders did after the Cuban Missile Crisis, when they concluded that the only way to keep the 
United States from coercing the USSR was to match the American nuclear arsenal. But just as 
the Soviet Union justified its quest for nuclear parity as necessary to stop the United States from 
engaging in counter-revolutionary activities and start treating the Soviet Union as an equal world 
power, China depicts its own weapons development and assertive behavior as necessary to 
uphold regional order, prevent provocation and crisis escalation, encourage diplomatic dispute 
resolution, and convince the United States to negotiate limits on the “weaponization of outer 
space” and other advanced military activities where it currently enjoys a big advantage.5  
 
The United States and China share interests in preventing proliferation and terrorist access to 
weapons of mass destruction. But the United States places more stock in intrusive inspections 
and coercive sanctions, while China is ambivalent about transparency and thinks behind-the-
scenes engagement is a more productive way to handle compliance concerns. Both countries say 
that the future of global security depends on the two largest economies learning to share more 
responsibility for system management. Yet, both harbor grave concerns about whether or not the 
other is a reliable cooperative partner. 
 
The second obstacle to U.S.-China cooperation on traditional security issues is that growing 
numbers of experts and policy elite in both countries do not think the benefits of formal arms 
control outweigh the costs and risks. The George W. Bush administration made this case most 
explicitly when it dismissed legally binding treaties with elaborate verification and compliance 
arrangements as “outmoded relics of the Cold War” which took too long to negotiate and did not 
deal effectively with the most dangerous threats, yet reduced countries’ freedom to protect 
themselves and their allies. President Obama’s 2010 Prague speech initially seemed to return the 
United States to its historical position at the head of global efforts to eliminate nuclear risks 
through international law and diplomacy. But after negotiation and ratification of the relatively 
minor New START treaty proved much more difficult than expected, the United States has not 
made much effort to negotiate further nuclear reductions, restart fissile material cut-off treaty 
talks, ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), or develop any proposals for legally 
binding space or cybersecurity agreements.  
 
Chinese leaders have usually been more ambivalent about arms control. They have not had the 
former Cold War superpowers’ extensive experience negotiating, verifying, and managing 
compliance with a wide array of arms control agreements. When the Cold War arms race neared 
its peak, Chinese officials said that once the superpowers ended development of new types of 
nuclear weapons and cut their existing arsenals in half, China would join all other nuclear states 
                                           
5 Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, “Keynote Address” to the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Chatham House, London, June 18, 2014. 
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in multilateral negotiations.6 After the superpowers eliminated all of their intermediate-range 
nuclear forces and agreed to substantial cuts in the first and second Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaties, China did become a constructive player in the CTBT negotiations of the mid-1990s. 
But after the United States failed to ratify the CTBT and walked away from the ABM Treaty 
without paying an obvious, immediate price, Chinese experts again began to say that their 
country would not join strategic nuclear negotiations until the United States and Russia brought 
their force levels and postures much closer to China’s current position. 
 
A third problem is that those in the United States and China who still do think formal arms 
control has an important role to play in twenty-first century security policy have not been able to 
counter the naysayers effectively because they lack a clear and compelling logic for why arms 
control is desirable and achievable among highly interdependent states with unequal power, 
mixed interests, and dissimilar values. So long as nuclear deterrence remains an important 
feature of security policy, some insights from the Cambridge community logic and the Reagan-
era logic will be useful for professionals concerned with reducing nuclear risks. But the vast 
majority of policymakers and citizens around the world are no longer deeply concerned about the 
possibility of global nuclear war, so making the case for arms control as a way to enhance 
strategic stability is not very compelling to them.  
 
Overcoming these obstacles requires creative thinking about both the technical and political 
dimensions of arms control as a means to address current and future security challenges in a way 
that fits today’s circumstances, not those of the Cold War. The technical side of arms control 
includes questions about what total number, type, and distributions of military capabilities could 
provide greater security at lower cost than at present, or what type of monitoring technology and 
inspection rights would deter or detect all militarily significant violations. Americans typically 
emphasize quantitative measures of arms control progress, such as how many fewer nuclear 
weapons the United States and Russia will have under New START compared with the number 
they had at the height of the Cold War. They also often suggest that the way to get domestic and 
international agreement about arms control-related questions is to let scientists from different 
countries work together to solve technical problems without distorting political pressure. 
 
Experts from most other countries see arms control as an inherently political subject, not as a 
technical problem that gets inappropriately politicized. By this, they usually mean that the 
interests, relationships, and decision-making processes of key participants in negotiation, 
ratification, and implementation inevitably shape outcomes at least as much as the technical 
characteristics of military and monitoring capabilities do. But arms control is also inherently 
political because it is impossible to think about it seriously without making some starting 
                                           
6 Chinese Foreign Secretary Huang Hua, “Address to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, June 11, 
1982, reprinted in Ken Coates, China and the Bomb, (Nottingham, England, 1986), pp. 64–80. 
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assumptions about nuclear deterrence, other countries’ intentions, the nature of international 
politics, and other essentially contested questions. 
 
When I have suggested elsewhere that neither American nor Chinese arms control experts seem 
to be making much headway with their own political and military leaders, or with those on the 
other side, my American and Chinese colleagues readily admit that is true. Yet, they often keep 
making the same type of arguments for security cooperation because they still believe arms 
control is important, and do not know any more effective way to approach it. They attribute lack 
of progress to obstacles over which they have no control, such as belligerent behavior by other 
states, the global spread of powerful dual-use technologies whose use cannot be monitored by 
satellites or other non-intrusive means, or powerful domestic groups in their own country that 
oppose arms control for ideological or economic reasons. Rarely do they consider that their own 
strategic logic for arms control—i.e. both a coherent conception of what the major security 
threats are, how cooperation could help address them, how verification and compliance issues 
should be handled, and where they want initial cooperative steps to lead, a viable strategy for 
getting international agreement and sufficient domestic support for measures that fit this concept 
of cooperation. 
 
To address these problems, I think we need a joint effort to work out the basic elements of a 
shared logic for arms control that fits current global security circumstances, is considered fair 
and mutually beneficial by countries with a range of interests, and can sustain functional 
collaboration even among states with very different political systems. I also want to start 
exchanging ideas about how this logic could be applied through practical projects that would 
significantly reduce current nuclear risks and improve conditions for more far-reaching future 
cooperation. But first, let me explain what I think is valid about two popular alternatives to 
formal arms control, what I find problematic, and why I think that twenty-first century security 
challenges still require a mix of formal and informal cooperative measures.  
 
 
Is formal arms control still useful in the Twenty-first Century? 
 
There are Americans on both the right and the left ends of the political spectrum who say we do 
not need any more formal arms control treaties because we can get whatever security cooperation 
we need through enhanced dialogue, increased transparency, shared norms, voluntary 
confidence-building measures, and coalitions of the willing. Some Chinese experts make a 
related argument, that global interdependence has reached a level where war would be irrational 
regardless of how many, or what type of weapons could be employed in a conflict. 
 
The first analysts to argue explicitly against the utility of arms control were unilateralists like 
Colin Gray who think that national leaders should make decisions about defense budgets, 
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weapons acquisition, and use of force based solely on their own calculations of national interest. 
They had been vigorously opposed to any Cold War arms control agreements that limited U.S. 
capabilities or potentially reduced support for military spending by the United States and its 
allies. Once Gorbachev began unilaterally reducing Soviet conventional forces and offering 
major nuclear concessions (for what they attributed solely to internal economic constraints rather 
than a reassurance strategy), and the U.S. public became focused on domestic issues as the Cold 
War ended, these unilateralists saw no reason to engage in arms control negotiations even for 
public relations reasons.  
 
Eventually, they were joined by Americans from the other side of the political spectrum who had 
been frustrated by the slow pace and modest accomplishments of Cold War negotiations, and 
who blamed the arms control enterprise itself for failure to make major progress once the Cold 
War ended, not the unilateralists who were complicating negotiations and delaying ratification of 
START II, the CTBT, and other treaties that had been signed in the 1990s. This group hoped that 
unilateral initiatives, norms, codes of conduct and other forms of cooperation that did not require 
painstaking negotiation of rigid rules, contentious ratification, and cumbersome implementation 
could accomplish more in a shorter period of time. 
 
There are circumstances where informal cooperation is all that is needed, or the only way to start 
on a difficult problem. But there are also some very important limitations on what can be 
accomplished through informal cooperation that reflect the nature of the security problem and 
the context in which it must be solved. 
 
Dialogue, transparency, and voluntary CBMs can be sufficient when misperceptions are the sole 
cause of a security problem. But they can increase tension when what states are saying, showing, 
or doing confirms the existence of serious conflicts of interest over which they are willing and 
able to fight if some red line is crossed. Even when neither side has aggressive intentions and 
both understand that war would be an irrational way to advance most policy objectives, making 
TCBMs the centerpiece of efforts to promote security cooperation can backfire. Because the 
United States and China both have good reasons not to show and tell each other everything about 
their military capabilities and plans, using the other side’s rejection of a particular TCBM you 
have proposed as a “litmus test” of its intentions can be misleading. It may look like the proposer 
wants to cooperate while the rejector does not, when neither country might really be interested in 
meaningful cooperation. Or they both might be, but have very different ideas of where to begin. 
 
Likewise, norms and codes of conduct can be used to reduce uncertainty, increase predictability, 
and minimize misperceptions when there is widespread agreement about the distinction between 
appropriate behavior versus actions that are irresponsible, reckless, illegitimate or aggressive. 
But when they are not clearly defined, legally codified, and supported by agreed mechanisms for 
verifying compliance and resolving compliance disputes, there is much room for confusion, self-
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serving interpretation, and disregard of “soft law” obligations when following those rules would 
be inconvenient. For example, in discussing territorial disputes in the East and South China Sea, 
Secretary of State Kerry framed the core question as: “whether might makes right or whether 
global rules and norms and rule of (international) law will prevail.”7 Yet, parties on both sides of 
the disputes can invoke international principles and precedents in support of their claim, while 
accusing the other side of intimidation, provocation, and attempts to change the ‘facts on the 
ground’ in their favor. The only concrete examples Kerry gave for how the conflicts might be de-
escalated and resolved diplomatically involved a 2002 Declaration of Conduct developed by 
ASEAN, a regional forum that does not include China, and arbitration under the U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, a treaty which the United States has not ratified. Even when 
there is near universal international agreement that some action is wrong, like sending troops to 
seize part of a neighbor’s territory, such shared understandings won’t keep leaders from doing 
whatever they calculate is in their national self-interest to do unless they care more about the 
general importance of upholding community norms than about whatever they might gain by 
breaking a particular rule, or lose by enforcing it. 
 
Coalitions of the willing, and informal cooperation among like-minded states are other forms of 
voluntary cooperation that are sometimes depicted as more “innovative” and more effective than 
formal arms control. Loose forms of policy coordination can be useful when interests are neatly 
aligned, and when states are naturally inclined to work smoothly toward a common goal without 
much organization or information.  But the informal nature of things like the Proliferation 
Security Initiative make it hard to assess if, when, and how they actually improve security 
compared to what would have occurred in the absence of such arrangements.   
 
Informal cooperation among like-minded states is more likely to work when the United States, or 
some other “benign hegemon” is willing and able to bear a disproportionate share of the costs.8 
The United States and its allies have the most similar interests and values, but even when they 
share a common objective, like stopping Russian destabilization of Ukraine, they can still have 
frustrating disagreements about leadership, strategy, tactics, and burden-sharing.  Countries like 
Russia, China, Iran, and India are even less willing than U.S. allies are to subordinate themselves 
to U.S. leadership without prior agreement on the ends and means of cooperation. Yet, most 
traditional and non-traditional security problems cannot be effectively addressed if cooperation 
                                           
7 John Kerry, “U.S. Vision for Asia-Pacific Engagement,” East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, August 13, 2014. 
8 Duncan Snidal differentiates between two types of hegemonic states, “benign” ones which use their power to bear 
the costs of establishing and maintaining regimes that provide public goods for other states as well as advancing the 
interests of the hegemon, and “malevolent” ones, which consider only their own short-term interests rather than the 
longer-term interests of all international society members. See “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, 
International Organization 39:4 (autumn, 1985), pp. 579–614. 
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occurs only among allies or other like-minded states, and only then when one country is willing 
to shoulder most of the burden. 
 
Another proposed alternative to traditional arms control sees economic interdependence between 
the United States and China as an overriding incentive to manage lower-level conflicts of 
interests without resort to war, much as mutual nuclear vulnerability gave the Cold War rivals 
one overarching common interest that dwarfed their stakes in regional conflicts and other 
individual disputes. With the 2008 economic crisis fresh in policymakers’ minds, the need to 
keep territorial disagreements and regional tensions from destabilizing markets enough to cause 
another global recession probably is of greater concern to U.S. and Chinese policymakers than 
the more remote possibility that conflicts could escalate to nuclear war. Depicting economic 
interdependence as the main motivation for security cooperation is particularly appealing to 
Chinese policymakers and international relations scholars because China and the United States 
are now roughly equal in economic power, while the United States remains far ahead of China 
and all other countries in terms of its military might.9 
 
The problem with using economic interdependence as a catalyst for cooperation is that countries 
can exploit interdependence for bargaining leverage to increase their own relative gains rather 
than working together to maximize absolute benefits and minimize absolute losses for both 
parties. Indeed, one of the tensions built into traditional arms control theory is between 
incentives for mutual compromise so that a crisis does not escalate into a nuclear war that 
nobody wants, versus incentives to “manipulate shared risk” so that the other side has the last 
clear chance to avoid nuclear disaster by conceding to the manipulator’s demands.   
 
The United States’ increasing use of economic sanctions to punish Iran, Russia, and other 
countries engaged in objectionable activities is one example of using asymmetrical 
interdependence in global energy and financial markets for coercive bargaining leverage. 
Russia’s manipulation of energy supplies and prices is another. Saying that China’s minimum 
nuclear deterrent neutralizes U.S. military advantages, leaving relative economic power to play a 
decisive role when China engages in strategic competition with others in the Asia-Pacific region 
is a third variation on the theme of exploiting economic interdependence for strategic 
advantage.10 
 
Stronger or more skillful players can sometimes get concessions by credibly threatening that the 
other side will be worse off if they reject some demand than if they acquiesce, but this is more 
like extortion than equitable cooperation, and it often backfires. Practicing coercive diplomacy 
                                           
9 Lora Saalman, “Placing a Renminbi Sign on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Reductions,” pp. 343–81 in Elbridge 
A. Colby and Michael S. Gerson, eds., Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2013). 
10 Zhao Baomin, quoted in Saalman, “Placing a Renminbi Sign on Strategic Stability,” p. 353. 
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generates mistrust and resentment, because the weaker player is much more likely to resist, cheat 
on, or break out of a coercively imposed arrangement than a more equitable and consensual 
agreement. It also gives potential target states a strategic imperative to preserve autonomy, 
motivating choices that are not economically rational, such as operating one’s own uranium 
enrichment or plutonium reprocessing facilities even when it would be easier and less expensive 
to buy nuclear fuel on the international market. 
 
In short, rising economic interdependence will not automatically lead to mutual cooperation any 
more than increased communication, greater transparency, and more vigorous efforts to promote 
one’s preferred norms will. Interdependence, systematic exchanges of sensitive information, 
shared principles, and equitable behavioral rules can all contribute toward a strategic logic for 
twenty-first century arms control. But to promote significant security cooperation between the 
United States and China, those elements should be fit into a larger conceptual framework 
identifying what the main security problems are, why particular forms of arms control would be 
mutually beneficial, how verification and compliance issues should be addressed, and where 
small cooperative steps might lead. 
 
 
A new approach to U.S.-China security cooperation 
 
Even those American and Chinese security experts who distrust each other and see a future war 
as inevitable would likely agree that now, and for the foreseeable future, a massive attack on 
their homeland is a much less plausible security threat than nuclear proliferation, catastrophic 
terrorism, civil conflicts spiraling out of control, or regional crises which escalate into a war that 
nobody wants. Complex interdependence and the global spread of powerful technologies to a 
wide range of states and non-state actors have vastly increased the potential for large-scale 
violence and destruction to be associated with what used to be considered second-order security 
threats, and nobody is immune. In a complicated, rapidly changing, and highly uncertain security 
environment, the basic question is this: Is better for the United States and China to compete for 
as much military, economic, and political power as they can get, and to remain free to use that 
power however they want to protect and promote their national interests? Or, should they make a 
greater effort to agree with other countries on additional rules, information exchange 
mechanisms, and other cooperative steps to reduce existing risks, minimize misperceptions, 
provide reassurance, and prevent new threats from arising? 
 
CISSM’s Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security program starts from the premise that basic 
trends associated with globalization are making it increasingly difficult, expensive, and 
ineffective for the United States and China to try to solve their security problems unilaterally, or 
to engage in close, sustained cooperation only with other “like-minded” countries. When the 
United States was the world’s sole military, economic, and political superpower, it could not 
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protect itself against the 9/11 terrorist attack, prevent North Korean proliferation, or replace 
hostile and repressive regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan with peaceful, well-governed 
democracies. As the gap between the United States and China has narrowed in each aspect of 
comprehensive national power, both countries have become progressively less capable of 
achieving their basic international security objectives without various forms of restraint, 
reassurance, and active collaboration from the other. But they will not be able to achieve the 
level of cooperation they need unless they use a new logic for arms control that fits current 
global security circumstances.  Let me suggest what the basic elements of this logic might be, in 
order to start a conversation about how these ideas could be refined and applied in ways that 
would make sense to leaders and publics in both the United States and China. It is not necessary 
to reach agreement on every aspect of the analysis in order to identify new opportunities for 
cooperation; arms control agreements have often been deemed desirable for different reasons by 
different states and domestic groups. But the closer we can get to a shared logic for cooperation, 
the easier it will be to negotiate and ratify significant new arms control agreements. 
 
Because the United States and China lack extensive experience working together on Cold-War 
style arms control, it may be easier for them to put a new logic for security cooperation at the 
center of what they try to do together than it has been for the United States and Russia to make 
cooperative security more central to their relationship than mutual deterrence.  But the level of 
mistrust is high enough between the United States and China that it is not enough to discuss 
abstract principles for cooperation. Neither side feels confident that it knows what the other 
means when it expresses support for “strategic stability” or “mutual respect,” and neither side 
knows how much influence professed support for such principles will actually have on the 
other’s behavior. Therefore, it is useful to explore how the logic of cooperative security could 
provide both countries with a new perspective on issues where long-standing disagreements have 
been major impediments to cooperation, such as missile defense and NFU declarations. It can 
also help build confidence to consider how the logic could be applied to carefully defined 
agreements on issues such as space security, and practical joint projects to advance shared 
objectives, such as minimizing the proliferation risks associated with nuclear energy, so that both 
sides could have a more precise understanding of what cooperation would entail, how it would 
benefit both countries, and how they could ensure everyone upholds their end of the bargain.  
 
Arms control for cooperative security. The first step is to specify the overarching purpose of 
arms control in a way that can appeal to a broad range of countries, as well as to different 
domestic groups within those countries whose support is needed for arms control to work. Here, 
I borrow from Hedley Bull, an Australian-born strategist and international relations scholar who 
spent most of his career in Europe, interacted extensively with American arms control experts, 
and thought deeply about how China, India, and other emerging powers would interact with the 
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more established nuclear states as their power grew. 11 He tried to write about arms control in a 
way that could fit with the interests, ideas, and values of people in all these different countries, 
not to present any particular country’s perspective as universally valid, scientifically correct, or 
morally superior. Bull wrote his classic works on arms control and international relations in the 
1960s and 1970s, yet I find that many of his ideas are a better basis for cooperation on Twenty-
first century security challenges than either the Cambridge community logic or a Reagan-era 
approach are. 
 
Like Bull, I would argue that the basic objective of arms control is not only to increase 
deterrence stability at lower cost and risk—although that will remain an important function so 
long as deterrence still plays a role in security policy—but also to increase consensual order and 
to strengthen the sense of society among states in a world of rapid technological innovation. 
“Consensual order” refers to distributions of capabilities and patterns of behavior which promote 
basic goals that are shared by all members of international society, and that are developed and 
upheld predominantly by cooperative rather than coercive means. Even when the Cold War was 
at its worst, Bull thought that all countries shared some security-related objectives. Not only did 
they have a common interest in avoiding nuclear war, but also in restraining other forms of 
physical violence and preserving international peace (i.e. the “absence of war among members is 
the normal condition, to be breached only in special circumstances and according to generally 
accepted principles”). Bull also identified other types of shared goals, including preserving the 
state system, protecting the sovereignty of individual states, managing economic 
interdependence, addressing resource scarcity, and socializing national leaders to be responsible 
members of an international society instead of trying to maximize their own interests at others’ 
expense. Since the end of the Cold War, these shared objectives have been joined by emerging 
global challenges, like mitigating climate change, stopping the spread of pandemic diseases, and 
operating an efficient, safe, and reliable global internet. 
 
Arms control affects states’ ability to achieve all of these shared objectives, not just the reduction 
of war and the preservation of peace. To begin with, complex interdependence means that what 
happens in the military dimension of international relations affects the political, economic, and 
environmental dimensions, and vice-versa. For example, money that governments spend to buy 
weapons is not available for economic development or social spending, but money they earn 
from selling arms abroad can provide domestic economic and political benefits even when the 
sales undermine arms control or nonproliferation objectives. Therefore, the United States and 
China will have difficulty engaging in mutually beneficial forms of economic cooperation if they 
fear that whichever side gets more from financial or trade transactions will use the resulting 
economic gains to strengthen themselves for military competition in the absence of arms control. 
                                           
11 Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (1961), The Anarchical Society (1977), and “Arms Control and the 
International Order,” International Security 1:1 (Summer, 1976).  
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They will also have difficulty cooperating on shared security objectives, such as dissuading 
North Korea from testing, selling, or using nuclear weapons, if the main international strategy 
being employed (sanctions) creates far more economic, political, environmental, and 
humanitarian risks for China than for the United States. And certain types of internal conditions, 
such as extent of press freedom or censorship, of corruption or rule of law, and of domestic 
political dysfunctionality, will naturally affect each country’s confidence in the other being a 
reliable cooperative security partner. 
 
A second reason why arms control is relevant to the broad range of goals that the United States 
and China share with each other, and with other members of international society, is that many of 
the most powerful technologies existing or under development today have both military and non-
military applications. Such dual-use technologies cannot be widely available for commercial, 
academic, or other civilian use without also being potentially used for hostile or destructive 
purposes by state or non-state actors. Nor can access to them be reliably and legitimately denied 
to states or non-state actors who are suspected of wanting to use them as weapons. The NPT and 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are the international community’s way 
of reducing the risks that materials, facilities, and expertise developed for civilian nuclear 
programs will be used to acquire nuclear weapons by states that did not already have them when 
the NPT was signed. That consensual arrangement has been largely, but not completely, 
successful. But one reason why most countries have signed the treaty, and few have been 
accused of violating it, is that most states that have developed substantial civilian nuclear energy 
programs so far are either allowed to have nuclear weapons under the NPT or are advanced 
industrialized democracies that do not desire their own nuclear weapons.  
 
The current system for managing the dual-use risks posed by nuclear technology will be become 
increasingly inadequate as more developing countries see nuclear energy as an important part of 
their strategy for economic development without devastating environmental consequences. 
Numerous other advanced technologies that are integral to the quality of life in the twenty-first 
century, including microbiology, satellites, and computers, also have both constructive and 
highly destructive military uses. They also tend to be much smaller and more broadly dispersed 
than nuclear weapons, reactors, or enrichment and reprocessing facilities are. But the 
international community has not yet developed anything close to the NPT and the IAEA 
safeguards system for promoting their beneficial applications, while preventing their misuse. 
 
A third way in which arms control is relevant even outside the military domain is that in the 
absence of a world government to make and enforce laws, sovereign states cooperate by 
negotiating more or less elaborate and explicit agreements; verifying compliance through some 
combination of data exchanges, remote sensing (national or international technical means), on-
site inspections (OSIs), and espionage; and encouraging compliance through a mix of diplomacy, 
norms, economic inducements, international law, coercive threats, and war. The more constraints 
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states put on military capabilities and behavior, the less salient threats and use of force will be in 
international politics. This promotes consensual order: states will be more inclined to make and 
faithfully implement cooperative agreements when the terms are mutually beneficial and 
equitable, and the decision-making processes are inclusive and fair, than when they are coerced 
into conceding to avoid worse consequences. For global governance without world government 
to go beyond a very superficial level, though, participants must develop sophisticated ways to 
monitor compliance and manage compliance problems that do not rely primarily on national 
intelligence, punitive threats, and preparations to resume competition at a higher level than 
before—verification and enforcement strategies that make arms control very unstable. 
 
This raises important questions about how far arms control and disarmament can go without a 
world government to protect rule-abiding states and punish those who commit aggression, 
violate agreements, or permit horrific violence against their own citizens. Under the United 
Nation’s Charter—which is the closest thing that exists to a constitution for global governance—
countries can have national military forces for self-defense, collective defense, and Security-
Council authorized operations. The Charter also directs the Security Council to develop a plan to 
regulate armaments so that members can fulfill these military functions without alarming others 
or using more human and economic resources than necessary (Art. 26). This unfulfilled arms 
control provision is rarely mentioned, while the Charter’s approval of national defense is 
routinely cited. 
 
If the United States and China want to avoid having security dilemma dynamics drive their 
military spending to levels that pose even bigger problems for economic health and social 
stability than they already do, they need some agreed way to differentiate between appropriate 
military spending and acquisition, versus excessive rates that indicate aggressive intentions.  
Both maintain that their current rates are no higher than necessary given their legitimate 
defensive needs and special responsibilities as global and regional powers. Yet, each also 
considers the others’ spending and acquisition patterns to be far beyond what it legitimately 
needs. Those concerns create strong pressure to reallocate even more government resources from 
economic and social needs to military spending.  
 
They also need a better understanding between themselves and with other members of the 
Security Council about which uses of national military capabilities are consistent with the 
objectives of modern international society and which undermine consensual order. For example,  
what constitutes legitimate self-defense or collective defense versus coercive prevention in an era 
when states or non-state actors could use weapons of mass destruction with little or no warning, 
or use cyber weapons to wreak havoc without a traditional “armed attack?”  If the Security 
Council cannot reach timely agreement about how to respond to massive civil violence, 
transborder aggression, major violations of arms control and nonproliferation agreements, or 
some other serious transgression of international rules, is military action by individual states 
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legitimate, and possibly even necessary for international peace and security, or does that further 
undermine consensual order? 
 
All of this suggests that even if American and Chinese leaders currently see no need to negotiate 
a START-style agreement with each other, there are plenty of reasons why they should be trying 
harder to reach agreement on a wide range of arms control-related issues. These agreements 
should be designed, though, less to alter the number, type, and distribution of military 
capabilities, and more to provide reassurance that whatever capabilities states have will be used 
for mutually acceptable purposes and according to equitable behavioral rules. To provide mutual 
reassurance about compliance with those rules, and to accomplish other shared objectives, states 
and certain types of non-state actors will need to be willing to share more information than they 
have before. But under what we call systematic transparency arrangements, access to sensitive 
security or confidential business information would be carefully controlled to prevent misuse for 
competitive purposes. 
 
Application to space security. To think about how this might work in practice, consider space as 
a strategic realm where the United States and China currently have high mistrust and 
competition. Neither country can reliably protect all the satellites on which their security, 
economy, and quality of life increasingly depend. But deterrence is extremely difficult in this 
domain, and an offensive space security strategy would be extremely dangerous. This creates a 
pressing need for mutual reassurance that states and their citizens are not using whatever dual-
use space capabilities they have in ways that deliberately or inadvertently cause harm, or create 
excessive risks, for others.  
 
The United States’ preferred approach is to build international support for a set of norms, or a 
full-blown Code of Conduct, that allows the United States to continue doing what it wants to do 
while branding some other actions, like debris-generating ASAT tests, as outside the bounds of 
acceptable international behavior. But China and Russia see the Obama administration’s support 
for voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures in space as a cynical attempt to 
reduce global pressure for legally binding constraints on the United States’ much more advanced 
military space capabilities.  
 
China’s approach to space security is equally unacceptable to the United States. With Russia, it 
has proposed a draft treaty on the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPW). 
The proposed treaty would ban space-based weapons and threats or use of force against objects 
in space, defined in a way that includes space-based missile defense interceptors but not debris-
generating ASAT tests. Although China has not destroyed any more of its own satellites since its 
2007 ASAT test sparked an unexpected international outcry, it has taken a page from the United 
States’ playbook by testing its hit-to-kill interceptors against missiles at a low enough altitude 
that no long-lasting debris results. These Chinese missile defense tests involve the same basic 
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capabilities used for anti-satellite applications. But the United States cannot object too loudly 
without acknowledging that the same is true of its own more advanced missile defense 
capabilities, and those that it has helped Japan, and to a lesser extent India, develop.  
 
Both the United States and China would like reassurance that the other is not preparing to attack 
their satellites, or conduct debris-generating tests that could inadvertently damage them. They 
will get further by specifying the problem in a way that covers both sides’ concerns, and thus 
creates incentives for both sides to cooperate. Thus, if the United States wants to talk about how 
China plans to use its advancing hit-to-kill capabilities, the United States should be willing to 
provide more reliable reassurance about its missile defense and anti-satellite plans.  
 
Some of that reassurance could come in the form of information exchanges and joint studies. For 
example, the more China has learned about the capabilities and limitations of existing missile 
defense technologies through its own research and development efforts, the less alarmed it is 
about the near-term effects of U.S. missile defense programs on strategic stability, although it 
remains concerned about the long-term effects of large U.S. investments in missile defense, 
especially around China’s periphery.12 The more the United States and China learn about how 
small and short-lived would be the military advantages of disabling or destroying one of the 
military satellites that the United States uses over the Asia-Pacific region for communication, 
intelligence, targeting, or navigation, and how much harder it would be to control conflict 
escalation if either side began attacking satellites, the less likely they are to see this as an 
attractive course of action.13  
 
If the United States and other space-faring nations do not want China or anyone else to conduct 
more debris-generating ASAT tests, then they should consider an equitable rule that reflects the 
dual-use nature of hit-to-kill technology. Both the United States and China have already 
mastered the basic capability, but there is more that both could do. Therefore, both might be 
willing to reassure the other by promising neither to test kinetic energy interceptors against 
objects in space or from objects in space, which would simultaneously address the United States’ 
biggest concern about China’s ASAT program and China’s biggest concern about the United 
States’ missile defense program. Russia is the only other country that has done a destructive 
ASAT test, as part of the Soviet Union, so all three countries would have a latent capability, but 
not one that they would want to try to use except in the more dire circumstances. It would not be 
hard to convince most other countries to join such a ban, and even if there were a few hold-outs, 
the normative pressure on them would be much stronger than it would be in the absence of any 
restraints on other countries.  
                                           
12 Gregory Kulacki, “Chinese Concerns about U.S. Missile Defense,” Union of Concerned Scientists (July 2014). 
13 Jaganath Sankaran, “The Limits of Chinese Anti-Satellite Capabilities and the Resilience of U.S. Space Power,” 
CISSM Policy Brief (July 2014).  
 
 




New opportunities for nuclear cooperation. In the nuclear realm, the United States wants China 
to be as transparent as the United States is about how many nuclear weapons it has, where they 
are, and what China’s future plans are for its arsenal. China counters that as the weaker state, it 
cannot provide such sensitive information until the United States provides reassurance that it will 
not use that information to launch a pre-emptive strike by making an unequivocal NFU pledge. 
Although the Obama administration emphasizes the importance of behavioral norms in other 
military domains, it argues that declarations about nuclear intentions are less meaningful than 
capabilities because intentions can be misrepresented or changed. The Obama administration 
makes much of the fact that the United States and Russia have cut their nuclear arsenals by 85 
percent compared to the Cold War peak. China welcomes this, but notes that the United States 
still has roughly 50 times more deployed strategic nuclear warheads than China, and 300 times 
more weapons in its total nuclear arsenal. Chinese experts also note that although the U.S. and 
Russian nuclear numbers have changed, their basic approach to deterrence has not as justification 
for why China remains unwilling to join in the next round of strategic nuclear reductions, should 
that happen any time soon. 
 
The basic problem is that American arms control proponents are using technical indicators of 
interest in cooperation—such as amount of information exchanged and the number of strategic 
weapons no longer deployed—while Chinese experts are using political indicators, such as 
declaratory policy. Even if the Obama administration could get Russian agreement to go beyond 
the New START limits to something like 1,000 nuclear weapons on both sides, those reductions 
will not give China the type of reassurance it wants. Chinese calls for the United States to make a 
NFU pledge and to publicly acknowledge a condition of mutual nuclear vulnerability with China 
are indirect ways of telling the United States that China will not consider limiting or reducing its 
own small strategic arsenal unless the United States unequivocally adopts a purely retaliatory 
form of nuclear deterrence, or changes its primary security relationship with China from a 
damage-limitation form of deterrence and defense to reassurance and cooperative prevention. 
 
One way to circumvent this stale argument would be to undertake forms of nuclear cooperation 
that have both technical and political dimensions and that are compatible both with China’s 
policy of minimum deterrence and the United States’ more ambiguous approach. For example, 
the United States could work with China and other states to substantially improve and harmonize 
national nuclear accounting systems without revealing sensitive nuclear information. This would 
provide reassurance that all countries with nuclear weapons have high standards of managerial 
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control, improve protections against proliferation and terrorist access, and lay the groundwork 
for future verification of deep cuts or total elimination of nuclear weapons.14 
 
Another form of nuclear cooperation that would promote both security and environmental goals, 
address the dual-use nature of nuclear technology, and provide a non-discriminatory way to 
strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime would involve U.S.-China cooperation on small 
modular reactors (SMRs) and associated fuel cycle arrangements. North Korea and Iran are the 
leading edges of a problem that will only grow worse as more countries see nuclear power as 
important for energy security, economic development, or air quality reasons. If nuclear energy is 
also to make a significant contribution to climate change mitigation, its global use would need to 
increase three- to five-fold by 2050, a feat that could not be safely accomplished without major 
changes to both nuclear reactor designs and international oversight practices. The United States 
has decades of experience with nuclear technology and institutional innovation, while China has 
the world’s fastest growing market for nuclear energy and ambitions to become a major nuclear 
exporter. Therefore, the two countries are logical lead players in an international effort to 
develop new types of nuclear reactors that could provide easily scalable amounts of nuclear 
power in a way that was inherently safe, required little or no indigenous nuclear expertise, and 
did not increase the availability of weapons-grade fuel or access to enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies. There are reasons to believe that it would be technically and economically feasible 
to meet these objectives by mass producing several types of small reactors (30 to 300 MWe) with 
sealed cores that could operate for 30 years or more without refueling, and that could be 
transported from a small number of regional fuel cycle centers by truck, train, or boat to their 
operational locations, then returned with their spent fuel to the regional centers.   
 
Lots of countries considering nuclear power would probably prefer to buy long-lifetime sealed 
core SMRs rather than traditional large light water reactors because the up-front costs are much 
smaller, the infrastructure requirements are much less, a reliable fuel supply would be guaranteed 
for the lifetime of the reactor, and responsibility for safe management of the spent fuel would be 
avoided. Over time, though, the best way to minimize the risks of nuclear energy would be for all 
countries to meet their peaceful nuclear energy needs by participating in this arrangement. 
 
A number of countries and companies are currently working on SMRs, but none of those being 
developed for near-term deployment have these advanced features.  Under current market 
conditions, no individual company or country will take the risks and make the investments 
required to identify the most promising proliferation-resistant SMR designs, determine licensing 
requirements, test prototypes, and build production facilities without having a large number of 
orders in hand. And, nobody will commit to buying a large number of advanced SMRs whose 
                                           
14 Jonas Siegel, John Steinbruner, and Nancy Gallagher, Comprehensive Nuclear Material Accounting: A Proposal 
to Reduce Global Nuclear Risk, CISSM, March 2014. 
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technological feasibility, performance parameters, and cost have not yet been determined. But if 
the United States and China joined forces, they could form a consortium of governments to 
undertake a joint prototype development project that would be at least as exciting and important 
as the International Space Station or the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor, both 
of which have or will cost substantially more.15 
 
These examples show how the logic of cooperative security can be used to identify specific ways 
for the United States and China to provide mutual reassurance and prevent new threats by 
prohibiting certain actions in space that are of particular concern to the international community, 
improving accounting standards and managerial control over their nuclear arsenals, and 
developing a new model for generating nuclear energy without increasing nuclear risks.  Each 
project has both technical and political dimensions. Each develops equitable rules for responsible 
behavior with powerful dual-use technologies. And each would increase transparency and 
predictability while still protecting against the misuse of sensitive information.  
 
A cooperative security approach to CTBT ratification. Many items that have been on the arms 
control and nonproliferation agenda for decades also fit into the logic of cooperative security, but 
using that logic changes the primary motivation for pursuing these forms of cooperation in ways 
that can generate new momentum to achieve them. For example, the case for something like the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty can be made much stronger by considering not only technical 
arguments for and against ratification, but also political motivations. The United States and 
China both played very constructive leadership roles during CTBT negotiations, and both were 
among the first countries to sign the accord. They are the only two NWS parties to the NPT who 
have not ratified it, though, and the treaty cannot enter into force until both have shown 
leadership in this regard, too. The leaders of both countries currently say that they are seeking the 
necessary domestic approval, but it has been a low political priority for them. 
 
Much more is publicly known about the ratification process in the United States than in China. 
One of the biggest problems in the United States is that the Clinton and Obama administrations 
have tried to make the case for ratification on apolitical, technical grounds, while the intense 
minority blocking ratification are driven by political motivations.  Many of them care primarily 
about domestic politics: they want to side with the Republican leadership in the Senate and 
against a Democratic president more than they care about how a negative vote will affect U.S. 
security or foreign policy. But some senators oppose CTBT ratification because their starting 
assumptions about nuclear weapons, arms control, and international politics make the costs and 
risks of ratification outweigh any potential benefits. These senators cannot be persuaded to vote 
for ratification with technical assessments of programs to keep the U.S. stockpile safe and 
reliable without nuclear explosive testing; of U.S. and international monitoring capabilities; and 
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of other countries’ ability to acquire or improve nuclear weapons without detection because such 
technical assessments do not address their political concerns. And, from a strictly technical 
standpoint, the CTBT’s non-proliferation benefits are low because an explosive test is not 
required for high confidence that a Hiroshima-type weapon would cause immense destruction. 
Moreover, the technical constraints imposed by the global testing moratorium observed by all 
countries except North Korea since 1996 are the same as those that would be imposed by CTBT 
entry-into-force, except for the additional verification information that could come from OSIs. 
 
A stronger case could be made for Test Ban Treaty ratification on political grounds at both the 
international and domestic levels. Inability to conduct more tests leaves the United States and 
China with some unanswered questions about weapons in their stockpile, and places some 
constraints on life-extension and modernization options, but it is not clear that this prevents 
either country from doing anything that they would otherwise decide to do. What matters more is 
how the two countries use the treaty to gauge each other’s interest in cooperation versus 
competition so they can make decisions about their own strategic programs. When the Clinton 
administration led global efforts to ban all nuclear tests, after more than a decade of U.S. efforts 
to prevent such negotiations, China decided that nuclear weapons would play such a small role in 
post-Cold War security that it had no need for tests to do some of the things that the United 
States and USSR had done, such as putting large numbers of independently targetable warheads 
on long-range missiles. China then made important concessions, giving up the right to conduct 
peaceful nuclear explosions and accepting more permissive verification arrangements. This sent 
a powerful signal to the United States and other countries that China had decided to play a more 
active and constructive role in building global arrangements for cooperative security.   
 
The willingness of Republican senators to vote down ratification of the first major international 
accord since the 1919 Treaty of Versailles that established the League of Nations, followed by 
President Bush’s opposition to CTBT ratification, and Obama’s passive support have sent China 
and the rest of the world a very different type of signal. These moves suggest that the United 
States is more interested in preserving its nuclear freedom of action than it is in cooperative 
security, even if it has no particular reason to think it will ever conduct another nuclear test. This 
negative signal has increased China’s reluctance not only to ratify the CTBT before the United 
States does, but also to negotiate a ban on fissile material production, or take other steps to 
reduce its own nuclear freedom of action. Failure to ratify the CTBT fuels uncertainty, mistrust, 
and worst-case scenario planning in both countries. But its effects on the broader 
nonproliferation regime are worse than on bilateral relations. 
 
From a cooperative security standpoint, a major weaknesses in the nuclear nonproliferation 
regime is that under the NPT, the five permanent members of the Security Council can have 
nuclear weapons and unsafeguarded civilian nuclear programs, while all other signatories 
promise not to acquire nuclear weapons and to let the IAEA monitor their civilian nuclear 
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activities. For pragmatic reasons, the non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT (NNWS) 
accepted these discriminatory rules on a temporary basis, but only if the nuclear weapon states 
(NWS) committed to negotiate an end to the arms race, reduce their nuclear weapons, and take 
other steps towards general and complete disarmament. The CTBT has historically been at the 
top of the NNWS parties’ list of arms control measures that they use to judge whether or not the 
NWS are living up to this NPT obligation, so it speaks volumes to them that neither the United 
States nor China has ratified the accord. This affects the United States’ ability to convince 
NNWS to accept more safeguards on their own civilian nuclear programs or to exert pressure on 
Iran. It hurts China’s efforts to reassure its neighbors and the rest of the world that as it becomes 
wealthier and more technologically advanced, it will not change its minimal nuclear deterrence 
posture. It also raises serious doubts among NNWS about the United States’ and China’s 
willingness to uphold their end of the central bargain in the NPT. When the 2015 Review 
Conference occurs, it will not be enough for the United States and China to repeat what they 
have said at every review conference since the NPT’s indefinite extension in 1995 about the 
United States’ numerical reductions or China’s No First Use Pledge if they are no closer to 
CTBT ratification than they were in 2000.     
 
The domestic strategy for ratification by the United States, and possibly also in China, too, 
involves putting the CTBT at the center of a debate between cooperation versus competition as 
the core principle for nuclear security in the twenty-first century. The reason why American 
unilateralists oppose the CTBT, a NFU pledge, and restraints on missile defense more intensely 
than anything else on the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation agenda (besides complete 
nuclear disarmament) is that giving up the freedom to conduct nuclear tests, use nuclear weapons 
against countries that have not used them on you (or your allies), and protect yourself against 
nuclear attack by anyone else means giving up the hope that the United States can meet its own 
security needs without any international cooperation.  This dream is cherished by a small, but 
vocal and well-funded, segment of American policy elite. Poll after poll conducted by CISSM 
and other organizations, however, show that the vast majority of Americans prefer cooperative 
security over militaristic unilateralism, both in principle and in practice.16 
 
As a formal arms control agreement, the Test Ban Treaty has numerous features that make its 
entry into force much better for international security than an indefinite continuation of the 
testing moratorium alone. It codifies a clear-cut behavioral rule: signatories will not conduct 
nuclear explosions for any reason. It creates an international monitoring system whose 
information, analysis, and costs are shared by all members, giving everyone reassurance of 
compliance and high confidence of detecting any significant violations. It lays out a process for 
initiating and conducting on-site inspections that was painstakingly negotiated to balance the 
                                           




Rethinking U.S.-China security cooperation   24 
 
benefits of access with concerns about false accusations, intelligence collection, and other 
verification abuse. The Treaty also creates an implementing organization that is inclusive and 
efficient to help states fulfill the core objectives of the treaty and expand the benefits of 
cooperation, such as using the treaty’s monitoring system to track the spread of radioactivity 
after the Fukushima accident in Japan. These verification and compliance management 
arrangements are important in their own right, and they help build up the institutional capacity 
and knowledge that will be needed for more ambitious forms of cooperation. 
 
Overcoming missile defense as an obstacle to cooperative security. If the CTBT is an issue 
where U.S. and Chinese leadership agree on what should be done (treaty ratification and entry 
into force), but have so far lacked political motivation to make it a high priority, missile defense 
is an issue where they not only disagree about what should be done, but are also handling that 
disagreement in a way that creates unnecessary obstacles to cooperation on other issues. Missile 
defense is fraught with more political symbolism than it deserves because its American 
proponents have made it into a litmus test for patriotism (e.g. there should be no limits on efforts 
to protect Americans and their allies), while China and Russia use willingness to accept limits on 
missile defense to gauge whether Americans favor arms control or unilateralism.   
 
One of the main reasons why the Obama administration has made much less progress on arms 
control with China, Russia, or any other country than one might have hoped after hearing the 
Prague speech is that it tried to finesse the politics of missile defense by pledging to continue a 
vigorous program (patriotism) while hoping that some unilateral changes to system architecture 
and voluntary transparency measures would reassure Russia without the United States agreeing 
that Russia had legitimate concerns. Although his missile defense ambitions are not as grand as 
his Republican predecessors’, Obama and his aides have retained the part of the Reaganesque 
logic for arms control in which deploying defenses reduces the need for offensive weapons. 
Therefore, they see no contradiction between Obama’s arms control objectives and his efforts to 
deploy limited defenses that might be able to intercept a few missiles launched by a proliferator, 
but do not reduce Russia or China’s ability to retaliate in the unlikely event of a U.S. attack. For 
domestic political reasons, though, the Obama administration has been unwilling to negotiate any 
new legal restrictions on missile defense to replace the ABM Treaty, so Russian and Chinese 
experts see U.S. missile defense ambitions as open-ended. And, because they still reason from 
the logic on which the ABM treaty was based, when they recognize that Obama’s missile 
defense ambitions are more modest than his predecessor’s, they still take his support for missile 
defense as evidence that he is not seriously interested in deep nuclear reductions. 
 
Using a cooperative security logic can be helpful here because missile defense is not as 
important in it as in Cold War logics for arms control to enhance deterrence stability. Fear of 
attack by nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles was at the top of the list of superpower 
security concerns during the Cold War, but it is much lower on the list of things that American 
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and Chinese leaders worry about now. The few countries that have long-range ballistic missiles 
are very unlikely to attack the United States or China, while those states or non-state actors that 
might be highly motivated to attack are unlikely to use ballistic missiles.  Furthermore, the 
United States, Russia, and China now have enough experience with missile defense to know that 
there are major technical and economic limitations on what can be accomplished even if a 
country is willing to spend more than thirty years and $160 billion on a major endeavor.17 
Therefore, a realistic assessment of current threats and defensive capabilities suggests that  
whatever a country thinks about ballistic missile defense, it should not let exaggerated hopes or 
fears about it impede cooperation on more urgent security problems. 
 
The foregoing analysis suggests a variety of steps that the United States could take if it wants to 
reassure China and Russia that its efforts to develop limited missile defenses are not evidence of 
U.S. unilateralism or threats to their deterrent. Perhaps the most reassuring step would be for the 
United States to accept legal constraints on space-based missile defense testing or deployment 
because that is the basing mode that is least promising from a technical and economic standpoint, 
but most threatening to large land-mass countries like Russia and China. The fact that the United 
States has not been willing to legally rule out a future development that would only be worth 
pursuing if the United States was willing to spend unlimited amounts of money for a small 
chance of achieving a comprehensive defense against nuclear missiles tells Russia, China, and 
the rest of the world that even if only a very small percentage of policy makers and U.S. citizens 
actually favor a highly unilateral security strategy, they currently have disproportionate influence 
on U.S. policy.  
 
If the United States wants more security cooperation with Russia and China without formal 
limits on missile defense, then it has to convince them that it is pursuing missile defense as part 
of a cooperative security strategy, not as a unilateral effort to weaken their deterrent. One 
frequently proposed way to do that would be for the United States to invite Russia and China to 
join in more extensive missile defense cooperation than it has been willing to propose so far. But 
it would be a mistake to put too much emphasis on missile defense cooperation as the first and 
best way to judge whether or not these countries can move beyond mutual deterrence as the 
primary basis for their security relationship because that keeps them stuck in outmoded 
arguments about the relationship between missile defense, deterrence stability, and arms control. 
The more progress they can make on some of the other issues that I have suggested are more 
central to cooperative security in the twenty-first century, or on other items that they jointly 
                                           
17 The Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) historical spending chart shows that the United States spent $164.7 billion 
from FY 85-14 on MDA and its predecessors in the Department Defense, but there is also money for missile defense 
in other parts of the DOD budget. The United States began working on missile defense in the 1950s, but the level of 
attention and rate of spending was much lower in earlier years than after President Reagan’s 1983 speech 
announcing his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). 
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agree to put on the cooperative security agenda, the more missile defense will be seen as a 





Skeptics will say that my way of thinking about security is outmoded and unrealistic, stuck in the 
excessive post-Cold war optimism of the early 1990s that has been decisively discredited by 
Russian aggression against Ukraine. Recent events in Eastern Europe, and many other places in 
the world, are just the latest in a long line of reminders that power politics remains a major 
feature of international relations. The question for the United States, China, and the rest of the 
world is whether power politics is all that matters in international security. If they do not believe 
that is true, then they should redouble their efforts to develop inclusive cooperative security 
institutions based on equitable rules, systematic transparency, and effective compliance 
management to reduce the risk of war, the damage should war occur, the cost of military 
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